Social Contract

Cécile Fabre

Contrast the following two political communities: one is governed by rulers who have not at any point elicited their subjects' consent to their rulership; the other is governed by rulers who would not be in power were it not for the consent of those who are subject to their laws. According to social contract theory, the former rulers are illegitimate, precisely in so far as they do not govern with the consent of the governed, whereas the latter are legitimate, precisely insofar as they govern with such consent (*see* CONSENT).

The thought that the consent of the governed is a necessary condition for political legitimacy is the defining feature of social contract theory. In this essay, I first give a thematic overview of classical social contract theory as articulated in three seminal works: Hobbes' *Leviathan*, Locke's *Second Treatise of Government*, and Rousseau's *The Social Contract* (Hobbes 1988; Locke 1960; Rousseau 1998, 2003; *see* HOBBES, THOMAS; LOCKE, JOHN; ROUSSEAU, JEAN-JACQUES). I then sketch out the tradition's legacy in contemporary political philosophy, notably in the works of John Rawls (1971; *see* RAWLS, JOHN).

In classical political thought, the social contract is an agreement whereby individuals who absent a state have natural rights to the means for their preservation, consent to lay down those rights, and subject themselves to the coercive power of the state, subject to everyone else making a similar undertaking (*see* RIGHTS). Social contract theorists typically address the following issues: the reasons why individuals do, indeed ought to, consent to the state's exercise of coercive power; the notion of consent itself as a legitimating condition for state authority; what exactly agents consent to. (For book-length and important studies of Hobbes', Locke's, and Rousseau's theories, see, e.g., Cohen 2010; Gauthier 1969; Hampton 1986; Kavka 1986; Lloyd-Thomas 1995; Riley 1982; Simmons 1992; Tuck 1989; Waldron 2002.)

Imagine that individuals lived in a stateless world, or, as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau put it, "the state of nature": there they would stand in a relationship of equality toward one another, as no one is sufficiently strong to dominate another durably; by that token, they would also enjoy natural freedom. As Hobbes claims in chapters 12 and 14 of *Leviathan,* and Locke stresses in chapter 2 of the *Second Treatise*, all individuals have natural rights over themselves and over the means for their self-preservation. And yet, the state of nature is not congenial in the least to peace and commodious living. In Hobbes' inimitable words, "in such condition, there is … continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short" (1988: Ch. 13). Although all three authors agree that human beings thus have good reasons, indeed are under a duty, to leave the state of nature and, through a contract, to subject themselves to the peace-preserving

The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Edited by Hugh LaFollette, print pages 4940–4949.

DOI: 10.1002/ 9781444367072.wbiee431

authority of a state, their accounts of why they should do so differ in important respects. On Hobbes' view, fear of death and desire for self-preservation are man's one and overriding motivation for acting; they also give him a moral permission to do whatever is necessary to secure his own survival. Add to this the fact that resources are scarce, so that people always have to fight against each other for resources, indeed for their lives; the fact that individuals cannot communicate properly with one another and thus cannot trust one another for lack of a common authority over the meaning of words; *and* the fact that they are by nature vainglorious: no wonder, then, that the state of nature, in which individuals are not under any duty to one another not to kill, maim, or steal, is a state of "warre … of every man, against every man" (Hobbes 1988: Ch. 13; *see* WAR; KILLING). It would be senseless, however, to leave the state of nature only to subject oneself to the authority of a state too weak to check individuals' desire for self-preservation and their concomitant drive to violent conduct: accordingly, the Hobbesian state to which individuals consent is all-powerful and leaves little room (it seems) for dissent.

Contrast Hobbes' unremittingly bleak portrayal of man's natural condition with Locke's. Locke agrees with Hobbes that individuals have natural rights, in particular the right to preserve themselves and the right to punish others for attempting to kill them or generally to threaten their survival (*see* SELF-DEFENSE; PUNISHMENT). However, the Lockean state of nature is not a state of license: if A has the right to survive, that means B is under a duty not to kill him unless he directly threatens her. If A so acts, but only then, he forfeits his right not to be killed. Moreover, unlike Hobbes, for whom the institution of private property can exist only once the state is established, Locke holds that individuals have rights of ownership not only over themselves but also over the things they need to survive: correlatively, others are under a duty not to take those things away from us (Locke 1960: Chs. 3, 5.) Finally, Locke does not see all individuals in the state of nature as greedy, lustful, acquisitive, and glory-seeking: many of them in fact are naturally peaceful and benevolent, and are motivated to fulfil their duties toward others. That said, although the state of nature is not by definition a state of war in Locke's thought, it is likely to degenerate into one, simply because in such circumstances it is up to each individual to decide whether her rights are being respected and to interpret the laws of nature. But disagreements on those matters can be very profound, even among well-meaning and well-disposed parties. Accordingly, individuals need a standard according to which they can decide whether their rights are under threat and determine what their duties to one another are. Relatedly, they need an impartial judge to arbitrate their disagreements, since it is a fundamental principle for conflict resolution that no one should be judge in his/her own quarrel. The central aim of the *Second Treatise* is to outline the conditions under which individuals may and must leave the state of nature to form a political society in which our rights are preserved.

In Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality*, which sets the stage for the *Social Contract*, we find strands of both Hobbes' and Locke's theories of man's natural condition (Rousseau 2003; Bertram 2004). In a vein reminiscent of Hobbes' moral psychology,

Rousseau depicts man as primarily concerned with the satisfaction of his own needs and wants and keen to acquire appropriate standing *vis-à-vis* others. Unlike Hobbes, however, and in tones echoing Locke's, the Roussean man is naturally capable of extending to others the care (or, in Rousseau's words, the love) he has for himself, and of showing them goodwill. Thus, in the incipient stages of the history of mankind, all individuals are equal in that no one dominates anyone else, and free in that they do not depend on anyone else to survive and are not dominated by anyone. Things begin to go wrong when individuals start associating with one another and form more complex relationships to which private property is central, for then inequalities arise and with them the seeds of war. Under a properly designed state, however, human nature is such that individuals could live together in a peaceful and harmonious society, free and as equals, by contracting with one another to become both members of the sovereign body which makes the laws (citizens) and subject to those laws. The aim of *The Social Contract* is to show, precisely, why individuals remain free and equal in such a state.

Thus, for all three authors, individuals are all free and equal in the state of nature. They all have rights to preserve themselves, including by killing others, and to the material means for their preservation. Yet, they cannot enjoy lasting peace unless they agree to entrust to the state the task of enforcing those rights. Prudentially and rationally, then, subjecting themselves to the authority of the state is the right thing to do: in Hobbes' vocabulary, the laws of nature, which individuals apprehend through their reason and which dictate how they may and need to conduct themselves in the state of nature, enjoin them to lay down their natural rights and subordinate themselves to the civil law (Hobbes 1988: Chs. 14–15; *see* NATURAL LAW). On Rousseau's account, reason, too, dictates that individuals should transfer their natural rights to the state (Rousseau 1998: Chs. 4–6). In Locke's theory, interestingly, not only are they prudentially justified in so acting: they are also under a moral obligation to God, who created human beings so that they may produce wealth, multiply and fructify, to secure the conditions for their survival (Locke 1960: Ch. 2). But why, though, is their consent required for the state to have legitimate authority over them? Is it not enough that it should provide lasting conditions for peace, irrespective of how it is established?

Clearly not. For all individuals, by nature, are free (though our three authors have different conceptions of what it means to be free). Consequently, they cannot be held under an obligation which they have not voluntarily imposed on themselves. In that sense, consent serves to confer legitimacy on the state's commands. Moreover, in consenting to the state's use of its coercive power as a means to secure conditions for lasting peace, and in expecting one another to abide by the terms of the agreement, individuals place themselves under an obligation to do so (Hobbes 1988: Ch. 21; Locke 1960: Ch. 7; Rousseau 1998: Ch. 6). In *that* respect, consent has binding force on the state's subjects.

We shall presently examine what exactly individuals consent to. Beforehand, however, we must grasp why, in classical social contract theory, the fact that individuals consent to the state's authority binds them to obey the law. Hobbes,

Locke, and Rousseau offer different accounts of the binding force of consent. On Hobbes' view, individuals constitute themselves into a political community by *authorizing* the state, embodied in the person of the sovereign (typically a monarch), to act as he wishes for the peace and the preservation of the community. But this alone does not suffice to show whence the obligation to obey arises. Hobbes seems to suggest that if individuals did not obey the sovereign, they would contradict themselves and thereby act irrationally, since they *wanted* the sovereign to have such powers in the first instance. The problem (which Hobbes does not solve) is that reason is binding *from a logical point of view only*: it is not *morally* binding.

Moreover, relying on consent to justify political obligation is problematic – and this is a difficulty faced by all social contract theorists, in so far as they have to show why individuals who have not actually consented to the original contract (e.g., the descendants of the original contractors) nevertheless are under an obligation to obey the law (*see* POLITICAL OBLIGATION). Both Hobbes and Locke rely on the notion of tacit consent. In Hobbes' theory, we can only surmise from the fact that people obey that they consent to the sovereign's authority. The immediate objection, of course, is that individuals may in fact obey the law not because they consent to the sovereign's authority but because they fear punishment; without clear evidence of their consent, it is not obvious why we should deem them under an obligation to obey.

Locke's extensive discussion of tacit consent does not fare any better (Locke 1960: Ch. 8). On his view, individuals give tacit consent to the state in two ways: through the acquisition or inheritance of private property, or through enjoying the use of public property (i.e., traveling on a public highway). On the former count, individuals constitute a political society so as to ensure that their property will be safe. In exchange for the safety of their property, they obey the law. Now, suppose that one of the parties in the contract, A, sells his property to another person, B: if B buys the property, she acquires its initial owner's obligation to obey the law. Insofar as B did not have to accept or buy the property in the first instance, the fact that she does means that she consents, if tacitly, to obey the law. The only way she can release herself from that obligation is to renounce all property under the state's jurisdiction – in effect, to emigrate.

Locke's claim that tacit consent thus understood generates an obligation to obey the law relies heavily on the assumption that an individual could renounce all property and leave, or that an individual could function in any given society without using public property. Yet, many are not able to leave though they want to; and no one is able to function properly without, at the very least, walking down the streets. Thus, it is not true that the fact that individuals stay in their country or use public property shows that they consent to its laws. Nor does it follow from the fact that B accepts or buys a property that she thereby agrees that the state will protect it, and therefore ought to obey: after all, she could tell the state that she will look after her own property. Locke's argument to the effect that tacit consent generates an obligation to obey the law is flawed.

Rousseau does not face the problems encountered by Hobbes and Locke on the issue of tacit versus explicit consent. On his view, the social contract is the mechanism by which individuals can leave the state of nature and form a civil society in which they remain free and equal. Only laws which preserve freedom and equality can be binding, from which it follows, according to Rousseau, that only those laws to which citizens themselves explicitly consent, through an expression of their collective will (or, as he puts it, the general will), can be binding. As we shall see presently, although Rousseau thus does not need to resort to the problematic notion of tacit consent, he faces the serious challenge of explaining how individual citizens who, on specific occasions, do not consent to the law are nevertheless under an obligation to obey it.

Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau thus conceive of the social contract as an undertaking, made by all individuals, to renounce the freedoms and rights which they enjoy in the state of nature, as a means to secure peace and the conditions for harmonious and commodious living. But what, exactly, are they consenting to?

In Hobbes' moral theory, individuals give up on most of the rights they had in the state of nature by transferring those rights to the sovereign. In particular, whereas in the state of nature they had the right to decide what to do in order to preserve themselves, in the commonwealth they must accept that the sovereign is the only maker, interpreter, and enforcer of the law, and must thus renounce exercising their private judgment (Hobbes 1988: Ch. 26). His powers are considerable indeed and include, notably, the power to impose censorship if he thinks that the untrammeled exercise and expression by individuals of their private judgment threaten the stability of state. Note, however, that there are two rights which individuals cannot abandon when entering the contract: the right to remain silent when facing a criminal charge and (more importantly) the right to self-preservation. The latter right implies a right not to obey the sovereign if the sovereign orders them to risk their lives, and to resist arrest if their lives are under threat from their agents (Hobbes 1988: Ch. 21). Hobbes' concession to individuals' rights flows from the very reasons why they enter the contract in the first instance: since individuals contract in order to preserve themselves, it would be inconsistent to ask them to renounce their right to self-preservation. None of this means that the sovereign does not have a right to act as he does. Rather, what it means is that in such cases, individuals are in a state of nature with the sovereign: just as they are at liberty to resist and indeed to kill him if he threatens their lives, he is at liberty to defend himself and the other members of the body politic, who have entrusted him with the task of punishing law breakers. In that sense, the subjects' liberty is entirely consistent with the sovereign's unlimited power. The difficulty for Hobbes is that the exercise of the right to resist the sovereign if the individuals' lives are under threat presupposes the exercise of their right to exercise private judgment, for if the sovereign is the only judge of the degree to which his commands are conducive to peace and security, then the right to self-preservation amounts to nothing. Hobbes, thus, is caught in the following dilemma. Either fear of death is the one and only motivation for entering society and, in turn, the one and only justification for obeying the sovereign; if so, individuals are not bound to stop exercising their private judgment, and, in turn, the sovereign

cannot have absolute power over them. Or they do not have a right to protect their lives against the sovereign; if so, fear of death does not provide the only justification for their obligation to obey and thus is not paramount in the state of nature, which, in turn, provides support for a much less absolutist sovereign than Hobbes is prepared to advocate. Either way, his absolutist project is doomed to fail (Hampton 1986; Kavka 1986).

Locke's political philosophy can be read as an attempt to block Hobbes' absolutism, by deriving what we would now label broadly liberal conclusions from similar premises. As in Hobbes' *Leviathan*, individuals contract with another to constitute themselves into a political society, by renouncing their right to do whatever they think necessary for their survival as well as their right to punish others for violating their right to survival. But whereas Hobbes fuses that initial contract with the decision to authorize someone to act as sovereign on behalf of individuals, such that the political community is constituted, as such, in virtue of that authorization, Locke distinguishes the contract from an additional, separate decision whereby the political community creates a set of institutions. That decision itself is not a contract passed by citizens with their rulers whereby the former undertake to the latter to obey them in exchange for peace and security. Rather, in so acting, citizens entrust their rulers with the power to pass laws and punish offenders. Put differently, rulers are trustees who act on behalf of the people (Locke 1960: Ch. 6). Crucially, then, Locke at this stage directly opposes those who advocate absolute monarchy on the grounds that individuals need for their own good to be entirely subject to the monarch, just as children need to be subject to their father. For if men are rational, intelligent, and free, there is no justification for imposing on them a regime in which laws are not made according to regular and transparent procedures, and in which they have no legal recourse if they are in conflict with the monarch who, in any event, is not himself bound by the laws he makes (Locke 1960: Ch. 6–7). Locke's own system is better, or so he thinks, because the legislature only has the power to pass laws which, in accordance with the laws of nature, ensure that people will not be threatened in their lives, limbs, and property (Locke 1960: Ch. 10).

Unsurprisingly, the claim that natural laws act as constraints on the legislature (and, by implication, the executive power) opens the door for the view that if the rulers overstep the limits imposed on them by the natural laws, then the people have a right to rebel since they cannot be deemed to have consented to such decisions. The people, thus, are sovereign and can dissolve the government if the latter (or, indeed, the legislature) is guilty of manifest violations of the laws (Locke 1960: §149.) Interestingly, however, the right to rebel is vested in the people as a whole, and not in a minority who might disagree with the majority's decisions on any given issue. So long as the majority acts according to the natural laws (and Locke believes that there are good reasons to adopt the majority rule when voting on laws), then dissenting minorities are under a duty to comply with the civil laws: to claim otherwise is to reject the very idea of a binding contract in the first instance, since it is tantamount to allowing individuals to go back to the state of nature whenever they disagree with fellow citizens (Locke 1960: Ch. 8).

Rousseau is similarly sceptical of the view that minorities may rebel against the majority, although for rather different reasons, which stem from his own account of the reasons why the social contract preserves individuals' natural freedom and equality. On his view, the first contract consists in alienating all of the individual's rights to the community (Rousseau 2003: Ch. 6); in so doing, the individual acquires a dual political identity: that of a citizen, who makes laws, and that of a subject, who is absolutely bound to obey the laws he has made. Rousseau, then, faces a challenge: if individuals are by nature free and equal, and if the sovereign created by the social contract – to wit, the whole community of individuals-*qua*-citizens – has absolute power over each of its individuals-*qua*-subjects, how are freedom and equality preserved? His answer to that question involves the use of a complex and idiosyncratic concept: that of the *general will* (Rousseau 2003: Ch. 7). When voting laws, citizens must act with a view solely to furthering the common good even if the common good conflicts with their own private interests, and must do so in accordance with their reason (*see* COMMON GOOD). In so doing, they act not according to their private will but, rather, according to the general will. Now, freedom, in the political condition, is defined as living under laws which the individual has voted for, which are the product of reason, which apply equally to all, and which promote the common good. Accordingly, if someone votes for a law which, for example, restricts opportunities to associate with others, she remains on a footing of equality with others since the law applies to all equally. Moreover, she does not lose her freedom, since she has voted for the law. If she disobeys the law, she will be forced to obey it by the sovereign: in fact, as Rousseau famously puts it, she will be forced to be free (2003: Ch. 7).

Suppose, however, that she has voted against the law: how can she truly be said to be free? Because when making decisions citizens should adopt the majority rule: in a passage which is sometimes read as foreshadowing Condorcet's jury theorem, Rousseau holds that if citizens are sufficiently educated, and if there is a better chance than not that they will reach the correct decision on the matter at hand, then it follows that the more people who make a given decision, the more likely it is that the decision will be the correct one. On that view, the citizen who is in the minority has been proved to be wrong: the general will, in that sense, does not reflect her actual will but, rather, her true will – the will she would have had if she had not been mistaken when thinking about the issues (Rousseau 1998: Ch. 4, §2; *see* CONDORCET'S JURY THEOREM).

The concept of the general will and the claim that individuals can be forced to be free have unsurprisingly elicited widespread criticisms from commentators. Let me simply raise one important difficulty with Rousseau's view. The general will reflects citizens' real wills only if there is a considerable degree of agreement between citizens. Yet, two kinds of disagreements may arise between them: (a) disagreement as to how best to promote the common good, assuming that they agree on what the common good consists of; (b) disagreement about what the common good itself is. If the disagreement pertains to the best way to promote the common good, it might well be plausible to say that a citizen who disagrees with the majority (whose decisions are taken in light of reason, and under the conditions set out by the jury

theorem) has got it wrong, and that the general will reflects his true will. But if the disagreement pertains to the nature of common good itself, then it is much less clear that the general will reflects his true will. For in disagreeing with the majority, he disagrees that the law represents a correct understanding of the common good. Such disagreements are profound and cannot really be swept aside merely by saying that those who are on the minority side of the vote have got it wrong.

Although Hume and Kant both developed their own versions of the social contract, the tradition witnessed renewed impetus and interest with the publication of John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* in 1971 (Hume 2008; Kant 1996; Rawls 1971; *see* CONTRACTUALISM). Rawls' aim is to defend principles for the just allocation of burdens and benefits among individual members of a scheme of social cooperation, on the assumption that individuals are rational, risk-averse, self-interested, aware that fellow individuals are equally self-interested, and committed to abide by those principles. Insofar as individuals are self-interested, they are likely to adopt principles which will systematically advantage them without giving proper consideration to the potential adverse impact of their choice on others, which (Rawls tells us) would be unfair. In order to filter out undue self-interested bias, Rawls places individuals in a hypothetical situation, which he calls the "original position," and in which they are not aware of their specific characteristics such as their natural abilities, gender, race, religious beliefs, and so on. Under the "veil of ignorance," Rawls argues, individuals, self-interested and risk-averse as they are, would choose an equal distribution of freedoms, and would accept an unequal distribution of material resources if such inequalities were to benefit the worse-off members of society (*see* DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE).

The original position is a form of social contract, to which the notion of *hypothetical* consent (as distinct from explicit or tacit consent) is central. That is, principles of justice are those principles to which individuals *would* consent *if* they did not know anything about themselves. A well-known objection to this hypothetical contract has been leveled by Ronald Dworkin (1975). Suppose that if you had offered to buy one of my paintings for $100 on Monday, I would have accepted. On Tuesday, I discover that it is worth $1,000 and I sell it to you at that price: the fact that I would have agreed to $100 on Monday does not mean that the court can force me to sell it to you for $100 rather than $1,000. However, the objection misses the point – though the reason why that is so brings into relief an interesting and fundamental difference between Rawls' and his predecessors' respective accounts of the social contract. According to Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, you recall, the point of the contract is to create conditions for peace by binding people into an agreement. On Rawls' view, by contrast, individuals' obligation to obey the principles of justice is not grounded in the fact that they would have contracted to choose those principles behind a veil of ignorance. Rather, it is grounded in the fact that these principles are just. The point of the contract is not to bind individuals to obey, but to function as a heuristic device which enables them to see what justice requires. Insofar as Dworkin's criticism misinterprets the Rawlsian contract as structurally similar to Rawls' predecessors, it misses its target. Still, it is not clear at all why individuals are bound by the principles

of justice. For suppose that once they leave the original position, they realize that, in light of their own specific characteristics, the principles of justice in fact disadvantage them. If self-interest and the expectation of gain are what drive individuals to respect the terms of cooperation in the first instance, then, insofar that Rawls' principles of justice do not yield the highest benefits for some people, the latter have no reason to accept them once they know what their real situation is outside the original position (Barry 1989).

In conclusion, the social contract tradition offers particularly rich and nuanced accounts of, and justification for, state authority and political obligation. At its heart is the thought that individuals are free and equal and, as such, are the ultimate source of legitimate authority. In its canonical works, it also tends to overlook socially significant facts about human beings which might, indeed do, affect the degree to which they really are free and equal, such as gender, race, and social class. Whether the social contract, as a mechanism for legitimating authority, can withstand such criticisms warrants further scrutiny (MacPherson 1964; Pateman 1988; Mills 1997; Mills and Pateman 2007).

***See also*:** COMMON GOOD; CONDORCET'S JURY THEOREM; CONSENT; CONTRACTUALISM; DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE; HOBBES, THOMAS; KILLING; LOCKE, JOHN; NATURAL LAW; POLITICAL OBLIGATION; PUNISHMENT; RAWLS, JOHN; RIGHTS; ROUSSEAU, JEAN-JACQUES; SELF-DEFENSE; WAR

REFERENCES

Barry, Brian 1989. *Theories of Justice: A Treatise on Social Justice*, vol. 1. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bertram, Chris 2004. *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Rousseau and the Social Contract*. London: Routledge.

Cohen, Joshua 2010. *Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dworkin, Ronald 1975. "The Original Position," in Norman Daniels (ed.), *Reading Rawls*. New York: Basic Books.

Gauthier, David 1969. *The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hampton, Jean 1986. *Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hobbes, Thomas 1988 [1651]. *Leviathan*, ed. R. Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hume, David 2008 [1742]. "Of Civil Liberty," in Stephen Copley and Andrew Edgar (eds.), *David Hume: Selected Essays*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kant, Immanuel 1996 [1797]. *Metaphysics of Morals*, ed. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kavka, Gregory 1986. *Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lloyd-Thomas, David 1995. *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Locke on Government*. London: Routledge.

Locke, John 1960 [1690]. *Second Treatise of Government,* in *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. P. Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

MacPherson, C. B. 1964. *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mills, Charles 1997. *The Racial Contract*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Mills, Charles, and Carole Pateman 2007. *Contract and Domination*. Cambridge: Polity.
Pateman, Carole 1988. *The Sexual Contract*. Cambridge: Polity.
Rawls, John 1971. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Riley, Patrick 1982. *Will and Political Legitimacy: A Critical Exposition of Social Contract Theory in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 1998 [1672]. *Social Contract*. Ware, UK: Wordsworth.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 2003 [1754]. *A Discourse on Inequality*, ed. M. Cranston. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Simmons, A. J. 1992. *The Lockean Theory of Rights*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Tuck, Richard 1989. *Hobbes*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Waldron, Jeremy 2002. *God, Locke, and Equality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

FURTHER READINGS

Ashcraft, Richard 1987. *Locke's Two Treatises of Government*. London: Allen & Unwin.
Cranston, Maurice, and R. S. Peters (eds.) 1972. *Hobbes and Rousseau: A Collection of Critical Essays*. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.
Crocker, L. G. 1968. *Rousseau's Social Contract: An Interpretive Essay*. Cleveland: Press of Case Western Reserve University.
Dunn, John 1969. *The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the "Two Treatises of Government."* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hampsher-Monk, Ian 1992. *A History of Modern Political Thought: Major Political Thinkers from Hobbes to Marx*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Masters, Roger 1968. *The Political Philosophy of Rousseau*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Morris, C. W. 1999. *The Social Contract Theorists – Critical Essays on Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Oakeshott, Michael 1975. *Hobbes on Civil Association*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Riley, Patrick 1982. *Will and Political Legitimacy: A Critical Exposition of Social Contract Theory in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Riley, Patrick 2001. *The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sorell, Thomas 1991. *Hobbes*. London: Routledge.
Warrender, Howard 2000. *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.